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This thesis is an examination of the participation of the Santal tribals, of West Bengal, in the Naxalite (Maoist guerilla) movement between 1967 and 1971. Changes in Santal society are reviewed from the late 18th Century onwards, in an attempt to understand the full implications of the transition from "slash and burn" forest horticulture to settled cultivation. Particular reference is made to the impact of commercialized agriculture and especially to the trauma of indebtedness and land dispossession. The effects of these structural economic changes, together with those of the unequal benefits of the "Green Revolution", are also isolated to provide a general understanding of the pattern of rural polarization and the root causes of Santal Naxalism and violence. Included is an account of Naxalite rural insurgency in West Bengal from its organizational initiation to its campaign of assassination and gun-snatching.
It was found that when the Santals became upset with the nature and pace of change (which they could neither understand nor adjust to), they attempted to change forcibly those groups whom they felt most threatened by, i.e., the jotedars and mahajans. In their attempts to reduce the pace and ameliorate the effects of change, the Santals stamped an indelible mark on the Naxalite movement through the use of distinctive tribal weapons, tactics and organizational symbols. Santal violence was aimed firstly at landlords and usurers, but secondly at the institutions of the State which tribals saw reinforcing the oppression under which they lived. The Santal conception of "Liberation War" exemplified a syncretic identification with the Santal insurrection of 1855, and thus an equation with the actions of past heroes. Ultimately, the Santals judged and wrought vengeance upon their enemies as they believed their forebears had.
It would seem that the Naxalite-tribal leadership consciously cultivated this association. The ability of the C.P.I.(M-L) however, to pose a threat to the Indian Union was shortlived; in the face of effective government counter-insurgency methods, the movement collapsed.
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(UnM)AAI8317059
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 44-03, Section: A, page: 0802.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Melbourne (Australia), 1981.
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