Game theory for political scientists / James D. Morrow
- Bib ID:
- 2030136
- Format:
- Book
- Author:
- Morrow, James D., 1957-
- Online Version:
- Table of contents
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- Description:
-
- Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c1994
- xx, 376 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
- ISBN:
- 0691034303
- Full contents:
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- Machine derived contents note: Table of contents for Game theory for political scientists / James D. Morrow.
- Bibliographic record and links to related information available from the Library of Congress catalog
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- List of Figures and Tables Preface and Acknowledgments Ch. 1 Overview 1 What Is Game Theory? 1 What Can You Do with Game Theory? 2 Four Problems in Political Science 3 Why Model? 6 The Rational Choice Approach to Social Modeling 7 Ch. 2 Utility Theory 16 The Concept of Rationality 17 How Do Utility Functions Predict Actions? 22 An Example: Nixon's Christmas Bombing 25 Certainty, Risk, and Uncertainty 28 Utility Theory under the Condition of Risk 29 Some Common Misconceptions about Utility Theory 33 Utility Functions and Types of Preferences 34 A Simple Example: The Calculus of Deterrence 38 Another Simple Example: The Decision to Vote 43 Why Might Utility Theory Not Work? 44 Ch. 3 Specifying a Game 51 Formalizing a Situation: Deterrence in the Cuban Missile Crisis 51 Games in Extensive Form 58 Games in Strategic Form 65 Ch. 4 Classical Game Theory 73 Defining the Terms of Classical Game Theory 74 Domination, Best Replies, and Equilibrium 77 Mixed Strategies 81 The Minmax Theorem and Equilibria of Two-Person, Zero-Sum Games 89 Characteristics of Nash Equilibria 91 Nash Equilibria and Common Conjectures 94 Rationalizability 98 Political Reform in Democracies 101 Candidate Competition in the Spatial Model of Elections 104 A Very Brief Introduction to Cooperative Game Theory 111 Ch. 5 Solving Extensive-Form Games: Backwards Induction and Subgame Perfection 121 Backwards Induction 124 Subgame Perfection 128 Sophisticated Voting 133 Agenda Control 135 Legislative Rules and Structure-Induced Equilibria 138 The Rubinstein Bargaining Model 145 Bargaining in Legislatures 149 Why Might Backwards Induction Yield Counterintuitive Results? 156 Ch. 6 Beliefs and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria 161 Bayes's Theorem 163 The Preference for Biased Information 166 Perfect Bayesian Equilibria 170 Nuclear Deterrence 180 Ch. 7 More on Noncooperative Equilibrium: Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 188 Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies 189 Perfect Equilibrium 192 Sequential Equilibrium 196 Deterrence and the Signaling of Resolve 199 "Why Vote?" Redux 212 Ch. 8 Games of Limited Information and Restrictions on Beliefs 219 Signaling Games 222 The Informational Role of Congressional Committees 227 Bargaining under Incomplete Information 237 Deterrence and Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs 241 An Introduction to Restrictions on Beliefs 244 "Cheap Talk" and Coordination 250 Ch. 9 Repeated Games 260 Thinking about Repetition: Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma 262 Folk Theorems 268 Finite Repeated Games: The Chain Store Paradox 279 Stationarity 291 Retrospective Voting and Electoral Control 293 Ch. 10 Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here? 302 How Do Formal Models Increase Our Knowledge? 302 The Weaknesses of Game Theory 305 How Does One Build a Model? 311 Appendix 1: Basic Mathematical Knowledge 315 Algebra 315 Set Theory 318 Relations and Functions 320 Probability Theory 320 Limits 322 Differential Calculus 323 Partial Derivatives and Lagrange Multipliers 327 Integral Calculus 329 The Idea of a Mathematical Proof 331 Appendix 2: Answers to Selected Problems 333 Notes 345 Glossary of Terms in Game Theory 349 Bibliography 355 Index 365
- Library of Congress subject headings for this publication: Political science Methodology, Game theory.
- Notes:
- Includes bibliographical references (p. [355]-363) and index.
- Subject:
- Copyright:
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In Copyright
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- Published status:
- Published
- Publication date:
- 1994
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