What Is Consciousness? [electronic resource] : A Debate

Bib ID:
10007589
Format:
Book
Author:
Kind, Amy
Online Access:
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=3615501
Login to access this resource
Description:
  • Milton : Taylor & Francis Group, 2023
  • 1 online resource ( 243 p..) :
ISBN:
  • 9781000866667
  • 1000866661
Series:
Little Debates about Big Questions Series.
Full contents:
  • Cover
  • Half Title
  • Series
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • Foreword
  • Opening Statements
  • 1. The Mind-Body Problem: Dualism Rebooted
  • Introduction
  • 1. The Mind-Body Problem
  • 1.1. Dualism
  • 1.2. Physicalism
  • 2. The Consciousness Problem
  • 2.1. Phenomenal Consciousness
  • 2.2. The Problem
  • 3. Why Consciousness Escapes the Physicalist Net
  • 3.1. The Bat
  • 3.2. The Color Scientist
  • 3.3. The Zombie
  • 4. Theories of Consciousness
  • 4.1. Representationalism
  • 4.2. Higher-Order Theory
  • 4.3. Russellian Monism
  • 5. Dualism Rebooted
  • 5.1. The Irreducibility of the Phenomenal
  • 5.2. What Science Does (and Doesn't) Tell Us
  • 5.3. The Way Ahead
  • 2. Non-standard Physicalism: The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness
  • Introduction
  • 1. What Consciousness Is
  • 1.1. Phenomenal Consciousness
  • 1.2. Complications
  • 1.3. Higher-Order Consciousness
  • 1.4. Access Consciousness
  • 1.5. Relations Among These Notions
  • 2. Consciousness and the World
  • 2.1. The Conceivability Argument
  • 2.2. The Epistemic View
  • 2.3. Alternatives to This View
  • 2.4. Features of This View
  • 2.5. Objections to This View
  • 3. The Metaphysics of the Science of Consciousness
  • 3.1. Case Study: Aaronson Versus Tononi
  • 3.2. The Laws of Consciousness Thesis
  • 3.3. Are There Laws of Consciousness?
  • 3.4. Consciousness Science Without the Laws?
  • 3.5. Consciousness Science After Ignorance
  • First Round of Replies
  • 3. Ignorance Is No Defense: Reply to Daniel Stoljar
  • Introduction
  • 1. An Analogy
  • 2. Why Should We Believe the Epistemic View?
  • 3. What Does the Epistemic View Tell Us About the Metaphysics of Consciousness?
  • 4. Where Does the Burden of Proof Lie?
  • 4.1. Denying Physicalism Does Not Commit One to Something Spooky or Supernatural
  • 4.2. Great Past Success Does Not Necessarily Mean Great Future Success
  • 4.3. Considerations of Simplicity Do Not Settle the Matter
  • 4.4. Should the Epistemic View Benefit From the Presumption in Favor of Physicalism?
  • 5. Where Does That Leave Us?
  • 4. Taking Non-Standard Options Seriously: Reply to Amy Kind
  • Introduction
  • 1. Russellian Monism
  • 2. Kind's Critique
  • 3. Must We Say What the Properties Are?
  • 4. The Combination Problem
  • 5. False Advertising
  • 6. Non-standard and Non-Russellian?
  • 7. Kind and the Structure and Dynamics Argument
  • 8. Dualism 2.0 and the Conceivability Argument
  • 9. The Mathematics Analogy
  • 10. Reconsidering the Space of Options
  • Second Round of Replies
  • 5. The Consciousness Slugathon: Reply to Daniel Stoljar's Reply
  • Introduction
  • 1. The Non-Russellian Epistemic View
  • 2. Is Dualism Impossible to Believe?
  • 6. Even More Seriously: Reply to Amy Kind's Reply
  • Introduction
  • 1. Details Don't Matter
  • 2. You're Not Done
  • 3. Burden of Proof
  • 4. Is Ignorance a Defense?
  • Suggested Further Readings
  • Glossary
  • References
  • Index
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Reproduction:
Electronic reproduction. Ipswich, MA Available via World Wide Web.
Subject:
Other authors/contributors:
Copyright:

Tools

Explore